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Floating or fixed exchange rates: The role of government size
Philipp Wegmueller∗
Abstract
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the reform of the international mon-
etary system by evaluating the net welfare gains of monetary policies with flexible ex-
change rates over a fixed exchange rate as a function of a country’s public sector size. The
argument goes back to Anna Schwartz (2000), who linked the role of government size to
the viability of a fixed exchange rate regime, as a response to reform plans of the inter-
national monetary system by the Bretton Woods Commission (1994). Using a standard
New Keynesian small open economy model to quantify this conjecture, three main re-
sults emerge: (1) The net welfare gains are increasing in government size; (2) The optimal
simple Taylor rule attains a non-negligible role to stabilizing fluctuations in the nominal
exchange rate; (3) Increasing public sector size reduces output variability irrespective of
the exchange rate policy.
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“The growth of government itself has destroyed the viability of a gold standard (Schwartz, 2000).”
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008 excessive exchange rate fluctuations have been
identified as one of the main structural weaknesses in the current international monetary arrange-
ments, such that efforts to reform the international monetary system regained traction (Palais-Royal
Initiative, 2011). Accordingly, the vision of such a reform would imply for some countries a return
to an exchange rate regime with a fixed rule for convertibility between national currencies.1 In re-
sponse to previous similar reform plans, Schwartz (2000) asserted that the appeal of fixed exchange
rate regimes has declined with the substantial increase of public sector size in the 20th century.2 The
goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative exploration of this conjecture.
The discussion on the relative merits of floating versus fixed exchange rate regimes and on op-
timal monetary policy in open economies has a long-standing tradition in international macroeco-
nomics. An advantage of flexible exchange rates is that they allow international relative prices to
realign quickly without the need for sluggish adjustments in domestic inflation. Being primarily
concerned with the level of the net welfare gains from exchange rate flexibility, several important pa-
pers have found that a complete stabilization of domestic inflation without explicitly considering the
exchange rate in the interest rate rule, i.e., with a fully floating exchange rate, results in the optimal
monetary policy.3 This finding has been cautioned by several authors, since it is an outcome which is
sensitive to many underlying factors, like the source of volatility, the assumption on local or producer
currency pricing or the role of the financial sector. For example, Kollmann (2005) shows that a fixed
exchange rate may be optimal as it completely eliminates shocks to uncovered interest parity.4
By contrast with this literature, the present paper focuses on the quantitative implications of
government size when changing the exchange rate regime from flexible to fixed. This question has
received much less attention in the literature. The argument goes back to Schwartz (2000), who
attributed the durability and viability of the gold standard in the late 19th and early 20th century,
besides of its stabilizing role as nominal anchor, mainly to the fact that the share of government
spending in total output was small, such that the adjustment of the private sector was facilitated.
With regard to this fact, in Figure 1 the size of the public sector expressed by the general govern-
ment expenditures (left figure) and revenues (right figure) as a share of GDP are plotted. The fiscal
data stems from a recent compilation by Mauro, Romeu, Binder, and Zaman (2015), and thereof a
sample of annual data between 1950 and 2010 for 22 OECD countries is considered.5 Median es-
1For instance, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker prominently called for a new exchange rate regime in the
style of Bretton Woods. See http://bit.ly/1BpZK0o, downloaded June 19, 2014.
2In previous episodes of the post-Bretton Woods period there have appeared similar reform plans. For instance, the
Bretton Woods Commission (1994) proposed a new framework for foreign exchange rates, which aimed at mitigating their
influence on market fluctuations and at shifting the management of their movements to monetary authorities.
3For instance Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Dedola and Leduc (2001), Kollmann (2002), Gali and Monacelli (2005)
and Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007).
4See also Calvo and Reinhart (2002), Sutherland (2005) or Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006).
5Mauro, Romeu, Binder, and Zaman (2015) have collected a historical dataset of fiscal variables for a large panel of coun-
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timates with the corresponding confidence bounds are computed. The evidence is striking. Both
fiscal expenditures and revenues have increased substantially between 1960 and 1980. The statistics
reported in Table 1 confirm this evidence. While the size of the public sector was slightly above 20%
in the period 1950-70, it experienced a sharp increase in the 70’s and 80’s, reaching a level of almost
45% in the period 1990-2010.6
Figure 1: Development of government size for 22 OECD economies
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Notes: Solid black line: Median estimate. Dashed red line: Mean estimate. Dark gray shaded area: 95% confidence interval
of median estimate. Light gray shaded area: 68% confidence bands. Source: Mauro, Romeu, Binder, and Zaman (2015).
Table 1: Development of median government size
Expenditure share Revenue share
1950-70 1970-90 1990-2010 1950-70 1970-90 1990-2010
Median 21.11 41.08 44.86 20.21 36.76 42.48
Minimum 18.09 29.68 43.02 16.90 27.99 39.96
Maximum 29.68 47.13 50.26 27.99 40.36 44.68
Previous theoretical works studying the implications of government size for the business cycle
tries. From the 55 countries in their sample, the evidence reported herein is restricted to the 22 main OECD economies.
The data refers to the most comprehensive sector of government for which it was available, i.e., general government con-
sists of central, state and local governments and the social security funds controlled by these units. However, government
expenditures do not include interest payments.
6Similar evidence has been reported by Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), who document for a smaller selection of developed
economies an increase in government size from an average share of about 10% of general government expenditures in GDP
in the late 19th century to 45% by the end of the 20th century.
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and macroeconomic stability are guided by the empirical evidence of Gali (1994), Fatás and Mihov
(2001), Andrés, Doménech, and Fatas (2008) and Leibrecht and Scharler (2015), who report for devel-
oped countries a significant negative correlation of aggregate private sector volatility with the size
of governments. One strand of literature links this stylized fact to automatic stabilizers and studies
the impact of government size on the volatility of output, e.g. in the traditional business cycle liter-
ature (see Gali (1994) and Guo and Harrison (2006)) as well as in models incorporating nominal and
real rigidities (see Andrés and Doménech (2006) and Andrés, Doménech, and Fatas (2008)). How-
ever, these studies have only dealt with closed economies and assumed that the standard technology
shock is the sole source of stochastic disturbance. The present article starts by extending this litera-
ture to an open-economy setting. A central contribution of this paper is then to provide a normative
study of public sector size in relation to the selection of exchange rate regime.
To study this question, a small open economy stochastic general equilibrium framework with
nominal rigidities is applied. The core of the model draws on the works of Gali (1994) and Andrés
and Doménech (2006), however, differences arise along several dimensions. First, the extension to
an open economy framework allows for a quantitative investigation of the link between government
size and different degrees of economic openness. Second, the model not only studies the role of a sin-
gle domestic technology shock but also includes foreign disturbances. These first two contributions
to the existing literature are not only crucial to study the welfare properties of different exchange rate
regimes, they are also important to capture the so-called compensation hypothesis brought forward
by Rodrik (1998). Accordingly, economies which are relatively open to trade tend to have larger gov-
ernments to reduce the risk from foreign shocks. Related to this and the present work is the finding
of Kamenik and Kumhof (2014), who show that net welfare gains of floating exchange rates increase
with trade openness. Third, monetary policy is given an active role in shaping the exchange rate
policy. This feature is important to gauge the relevance of exchange rate stabilization depending on
government size. Finally, the model includes a fiscal rule which stipulates that the government sets
taxes as a function of its passed liabilities. This establishes a link between the exchange rate policy
and the generation of public sector revenues, hence generating a direct channel to the decision of
how the government sets the tax rate.
The concept of government size adopted in this paper follows the related literature and is based
on the revenue and expenditure shares of the government. Specifically, a larger government size
means a higher steady state government consumption-to-GDP ratio and an equally higher income
tax rate. Similar to Kamenik and Kumhof (2014), content to the numerical analysis of exchange rate
flexibility is given by evaluating the response of the model economy to shocks under either a fixed
or a flexible exchange rate regime and at different degrees of government size. A regime of flexible
exchange rates is either defined by a money supply rule or by a welfare maximizing optimal sim-
ple interest rate rule, which is very commonly used in practice.7 The welfare metric is computed
by means of a second-order approximation of the model following the methodology of Kim, Kim,
Schaumburg, and Sims (2008). On the one hand, the paper compares the welfare costs of eliminat-
7See for instance Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) or Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007).
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ing the business cycle for different sizes of the public sector. This approach is for instance related
to Kollmann (2002), Kollmann (2005) and Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007). On the other hand,
comparable to Kamenik and Kumhof (2014), the change in the benefit of exchange rate flexibility as
government size increases is calculated as the incremental welfare gain of flexible over fixed exchange
rates.
The main result is that the net welfare costs of pegging the exchange rate monotonically increase
with government size. Although increasing the size of government mitigates output variability irre-
spective of the exchange rate regime in place, the volatility of private consumption is an increasing
function of public sector size and crucially affected by the exchange rate regime in place. The intu-
ition for the connection between government size and the exchange rate regime is based on two facts.
On the real side, economies with large governments exhibit higher private sector volatility as a result
of a composition effect. Everything else equal, private consumption and investment have to absorb
more volatility of the shocks, the larger the rigid public sector. Moreover, a large government comes
along with a high income tax rate, which has a distorting effect on households’ labor supply decision,
inducing more volatility in the welfare relevant hours worked. On the nominal side, besides affect-
ing prices, the monetary policy and exchange rate regime in place have an effect on the government’s
budget constraint and consequently its capacity to adjust the income tax rate. For instance, when the
monetary authority conducts a money supply rule with purely floating exchange rates, seigniorage
revenues are constant and the government can only pay back its liabilities by generating a primary
surplus, i.e. the difference in tax revenues to its consumption expenditures. If instead the central
bank credibly pegs the exchange rate, it looses a policy instrument and hence an important adjust-
ment mechanism. This induces per se additional variability into prices, hence affecting negatively
the volatility of private consumption. Moreover, to sustain a credible peg, the central bank has to
adjust endogenously its money supply, which implies possibly generating seigniorage revenues to
the government. This additional revenue in turn alleviates the government budget constraint, allow-
ing the government to hold less liabilities and thus give a more prominent role for counter-cyclical
tax adjustments. Consequently, large governments have a destabilizing effect on private sector ac-
tivity, which is magnified substantially when the central bank decides to prevent the possibility of a
nominal exchange rate adjustment to foreign shocks.
The paper further examines how the main results depend upon the specifications of fiscal and
monetary policy. When the fiscal authority decides to use lump-sum rather than distortionary tax-
ation as a policy instrument, the level of the income tax no longer twists the labor supply decision
such that the volatility of hours worked and consequently aggregate volatility is substantially re-
duced. Changing the fiscal rule to a spending rather than revenue rule has similar implications. By
magnifying the effect of automatic stabilization, the variability in private consumption is diminished,
implying lower net welfare gains of floating exchange rates. When the central bank runs a Taylor rule
different from the optimal simple rule studied in the benchmark experiment, for instance by targeting
domestic inflation only, the qualitative implications of the main results remain robust. Importantly,
whenever the stabilization of variability in the nominal exchange rate is included in the policy rule, it
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is optimal to attain a weight larger than zero to this objective. In other words, mitigating fluctuations
in the nominal exchange rate is welfare superior to a purely floating exchange rate regime. When
it comes to model parameters, the Frish elasticity of labor supply takes on an important role: a low
value reinforces the destabilizing effect of the income tax rate on the household’s labor supply deci-
sion, hence increasing the volatility of hours worked. If, on the other hand the labor supply elasticity
is large, then hours worked are less responsive to changes in the tax rate and the net welfare gains are
lower than in the benchmark. Overall, for any parameter specification studied it is reported that net
welfare gains of floating exchange rate regimes over a strict peg increase with the size of government.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the baseline small open economy
model. Section 3 presents the model calibration and the computational details. Focusing on the
quantitative properties of government size and the exchange rate regime, Section 4 analyzes welfare,
second moments and dynamic responses generated by the proposed model. Sections 5 discusses the
robustness of the main results to changes in policies and parametrization. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
The starting point for the investigation of the welfare consequences of alternative exchange rate ar-
rangements as a function of public sector size is a baseline small open economy.8 The domestic
economy is small with respect to the rest of the world and consists of three building blocks. First,
there is a utility maximizing infinitely lived representative household who can buy internationally
traded goods and has access to domestic and foreign bonds. Capital is included in the model to stay
close to the related literature examining the effects of government size and automatic stabilizers.9
The second building block consists of final goods and intermediate goods producing firms. The final
goods sector is perfectly competitive, while there is monopolistic competition in the intermediate
goods sector. Intermediate goods producers face nominal rigidities in the form of price adjustment
costs and use capital and labor as productive inputs. The public sector constitutes the third building
block. In order to finance a certain level of public consumption, the government creates revenues
from levying time-varying distortionary income taxes and from seigniorage. The central bank can
follow three policies: Either it follows a constant money growth rule, strictly pegs the exchange rate
or operates a nominal interest rate rule.
I follow the standard notational convention to indicate foreign variables with a superscripted
asterisk and the destination of traded variables with a subscripted H or F, respectively. Lower case
letters denote real variables whereas upper case letters denote nominal variables.
2.1 Households
The domestic household derives utility U
(
ct, MtPt , lt
)
from a bundle of consumption goods ct, from
holding real money balances MtPt and from enjoying leisure lt. The total time endowment is normal-
8Recent examples of similar models include Gali and Monacelli (2005) (although with complete asset markets), Koll-
mann (2005), Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007) and Divino (2009) among many others.
9For instance Andrés and Doménech (2006) and Andrés, Doménech, and Fatas (2008).
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ized to unity such that the time constraint of the household reads
lt = 1− nt, (2.1)
with nt ∈ (0, 1) standing for hours worked. U (· ) is a temporal utility function which is increasing
and concave in its three arguments. The representative household maximizes its expected lifetime
utility
arg max
S
U0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtU
(
ct,
Mt
Pt
, lt
)
, 0 < β < 1,
in which E0 is the conditional expectations operator in period 0, and β is the discount factor. The
household maximizes utility by choosing optimally a sequence of S =
{
ct, it, MtPt , nt, BF,t, BH,t
}∞
t=0
subject to the period-by-period budget constraint
Pt(ct + it + ΨB(StBF,t)) + BH,t + StBF,t + Mt
≤ (1− τDt )(Wtnt + Rzt kt) + Rt−1BH,t−1 + StR∗t−1BF,t−1 + Mt−1 + Πt + PH,tτLt . (2.2)
Note that BH,t is a one-period domestic bond, which cannot be traded internationally and is in zero
net supply at the domestic household level. The domestic bond returns a gross nominal rate of
interest Rt. BF,t is a traded one-period foreign bond denominated in the foreign currency with an
exogenous gross nominal return of R∗t . It is costly to hold a quantity of foreign assets in the portfolio
which is away from some long-run level B̄F. Following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), ΨB(StBF,t)10
describes the convex portfolio adjustment cost function and serves to induce stationarity into the
foreign debt process and to close the small open economy model.11 Mt−1 is the amount of money
which the household brings into period t and Mt is the end of period money stock of the household.
It derives income from selling labor nt at the nominal wage rate Wt and from renting capital to firms
at a rental rate Rzt . Πt is the dividend payment the household gets from the domestic competitive
firms. It has to pay a time-varying distortionary income tax τD and pays (receives) τLt as a lump-sum
tax (transfer) to (from) the government.12 All these variables are denominated in domestic currency,
with Pt being the nominal price of the final domestic consumption good. St is the nominal exchange
rate, specified such that an increase in St implies a depreciation of the domestic currency.13
The household allocates resources between consumption ct and investment into physical capital,
it. The consumption bundle ct comprises final tradable domestic and foreign goods, summarized in a
10Ψ′B(StBF,t) > 0, Ψ
′′
B(StBF,t) > 0, with ΨB(S̄B̄F) = Ψ
′
B(S̄B̄F) = 0 and Ψ
′′
B(S̄B̄F) = ψB
11This approach also comes to use in related papers with small open economy models, such as Devereux, Lane, and
Xu (2006), Shi (2011) and Punzi (2013). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) show that portfolio adjustment costs are one way
among others (e.g., endogenous discount rate, debt elastic interest rate, complete asset markets) to get rid of the unit root
problem of net foreign assets in small open economy models. Most importantly, all approaches to eliminate this unit root
problem deliver virtually identical dynamics at business-cycle frequencies, as measured by unconditional second moments
and impulse response functions.
12From here on it is referred to τL as a lump-sum tax, irrespective of its sign.
13The amount of domestic currency per units of foreign currency defines the nominal exchange rate. ∆St = StSt−1 . When
∆St > 1, the domestic currency depreciates, i.e., the domestic household has to pay more for foreign currency in period t
than in period (t− 1).
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CES aggregation function, formally
ct =
[
(1− γ)
1
η c
η−1
η
H,t + γ
1
η c
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
, (2.3)
in which the parameter η > 0 measures the elasticity of substitution between the two goods. The
parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] indexes the degree of value the household attributes to the good from the foreign
economy. γ can be thought of as a natural measure of openness, which accounts for the degree of
home bias. The consumer price index (CPI) is then a weighted average of the price level in the
domestic economy and the price level in the foreign economy, given by
Pt =
[
(1− γ)P1−ηH,t + γP
1−η
F,t
] 1
1−η
. (2.4)
PH,t(PF,t) is the average price of domestically (foreign) produced consumption goods. The solution
to the optimal expenditure allocation problem of the household yields the demand equations for the
home and foreign good:
cH,t = (1− γ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
ct; cF,t = γ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
ct. (2.5)
The law of motion for physical capital is
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt −ΨK(it, kt) + it, (2.6)
where δ is the depreciation rate and the function ΨK(·) = ψK(·)kt denotes the cost of adjusting
the capital stock.14 With equation (2.2) and the necessary transversality condition to prevent the
household from engaging in Ponzi schemes, the household’s optimization problem is characterized
by first order conditions which are standard in the literature.15
2.2 Private sector
There is imperfect competition in the intermediate goods sector such that intermediate goods pro-
ducing firms are price setters.16 In the domestic production sector, we have a competitive firm that
aggregates intermediate inputs from monopolistically competitive firms into a final good. Nominal
rigidities are introduced by adopting the framework of costly price adjustments in the intermediate
goods sector, as proposed by Rotemberg (1982).
Final good firm. The competitive final good firm uses the following constant returns to scale tech-
nology:
yt =
[∫ 1
0
yt(j)
ε−1
ε dj
] ε
ε−1
, (2.7)
14Schmitt-Grohé (1998) shows that investment tends to exhibit excess volatility in small open economy models. To avoid
this, capital adjustment costs are introduced following Hayashi (1982). The function ψK(·) is increasing and concave,
satisfying ψ′K > 0, ψ
′′
k > 0, with ψK(δ) = ψ
′
K(δ) = 0 and ψ
′′
K(δ) = ψK > 0.
15The transversality condition is given by limt⇒∞ βtΩt+1Λt = 0, with Ωt = BH,t + StBF,t + Mt. See A for a detailed list
of first order conditions and equilibrium conditions.
16See for example Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002).
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with ε > 1 denoting the constant elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate inputs.
Demand faced by each individual domestic good, j, is
yt(j) =
[
PH,t(j)
PH,t
]−ε
yt, (2.8)
in which yt is the total domestic demand for the final good, and
PH,t(j)
PH,t
is the relative price of each
variety with respect to the aggregate domestic price level, PH,t, which is given by
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)1−εdj
] 1
1−ε
. (2.9)
Intermediate goods producer. There is a continuum of intermediate goods producing firms in the
(0, 1) interval. Each intermediate firm j produces output using capital and labor as productive inputs,
yt(j) = atkt(j)αnt(j)(1−α), (2.10)
in which α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share. The technology level at follows an AR(1)-process with |ρa| < 1
and εa,t ∼ N (0, σ2a ) and is identical to all domestic intermediate goods producers. There is perfect
competition in the input markets, with firms minimizing their production costs by choosing opti-
mally the amount of labor and capital, taking wages and the rental rate of capital as given. Since
firms are identical, they all choose the same amount of private inputs. Real marginal costs are de-
rived from cost minimization such that by aggregating the first order conditions to this problem the
demand for labor and capital can be obtained:
Wt
PH,t
= (1− α)mct
yt
nt
,
Rzt
PH,t
= αmct
yt
kt
. (2.11)
Firms are monopolistically competitive in the intermediate goods market. When the firm decides to
change its price, it faces a quadratic price-adjustment cost as proposed by Rotemberg (1982). The
following equation gives the real cost function:
ΨP(·) ≡
κ
2
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t−1(j)
− π̄H
)2
yt, (2.12)
in which κ > 0 determines the degree of nominal price rigidity. Adjustment costs increasing with the
size of the price change and with the overall economic activity. There are no costs to adjusting prices
when the steady state domestic inflation rate, π̄H, prevails.
The intermediate goods producing firm maximizes its expected future discounted real value of
profits
Et
[
∞
∑
τ=0
Φt+τ,t
Πt+τ(j)
PH,t+τ
]
.
Φt+i,t is the stochastic discount factor given by βi
[
Uc,t+i
Uc,t
]
and Πt+i(j)PH,t+i are the real value profits of inter-
mediate goods firms. The intermediate goods producing firm maximizes expected future discounted
8
profits subject to the demand equation for good j, given by equation (2.8). In a symmetric equilib-
rium, all firms choose the same price PH,t(j) = PH,t(j′) = PH,t and also
PH,t
PH,t−1
= πH,t, hence
(ε− 1)
ε
= mct −
κ
ε
{
(πH,t − π̄H)πH,t + βEt
[
(πH,t+1 − π̄H)πH,t+1
(
yt+1
yt
)(
λt+1
λt
)]}
. (2.13)
A first-order linear approximation of equation (2.13) around its non-stochastic steady state yields the
standard Phillips curve on domestic producer prices
π̂H,t =
ε− 1
κπ̄H
m̂ct + βEtπ̂H,t+1. (2.14)
Domestic inflation depends upon the price elasticity of demand, ε, the level of price adjustment costs,
κ, as well as on the adjustment in real marginal costs, m̂ct. Note that in the case of κ → 0, we have
fully flexible prices and a constant markup equal to ε−1ε .
2.3 Government
The consolidated government prints money Mt, issues one-period nominal risk-free bonds, BH,t,
generates tax revenues in the amount of PH,tτt, and has expenditures gt. The period-by-period budget
constraint in nominal terms is given by
Mt + BH,t + PH,tτt = Rt−1BH,t−1 + Mt−1 + PH,tgt. (2.15)
Note that Rt denotes the one-period nominal risk-free interest rate in period t. The amount of govern-
ment purchases gt is fully allocated to domestically produced goods and fixed at some level ḡ for all
time periods.17 One way how the government collects its revenues is through household taxation, τt.
The government finances its purchases of goods and services from the private sector through time-
varying distortionary income taxes τDt and a lump-sum tax τ
L
t . Total tax revenues are then given
by
τt = τ
L
t + τ
D
t yt. (2.16)
Besides collecting tax revenues, the government also generates revenues from direct receipts of the
central bank, denoted by RCBt. To see this, consider the budget identity for the central bank,
RCBt = Mt −Mt−1. (2.17)
17Two comments are in order here: (1) The assumption of 100% home bias in government spending is supported by
evidence found in Trionfetti (2000) and Brülhart and Trionfetti (2004), who find in the OECD economies a substantially
stronger home bias in government consumption relative to private consumption. This implies on the one hand that gov-
ernment spending is not exposed to adjustments in the terms of trade, i.e., to exchange rate risk (see for instance Gali and
Monacelli (2008)). On the other hand, the terms of trade show up in the aggregate resource constraint (Equation 2.31). See
Section 4.3.1 for further details. (2) In contrast to the evidence presented in Figure 1, in the present experiment, mainly to
keep it tractable, it is not distinguished between the different components of government expenditures. For example Finn
(1998), Quadrini and Trigari (2007) or Gomes (2010) study the role of public employment and wages in business cycle mod-
els. As it is not the aim of the present paper to investigate the cyclical implications of different measures of government
spending, it is abstracted from this differentiation by taking a shortcut and fixing the total amount of public spending at
some level ḡ.
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Equation (2.17) states that the central bank’s own liabilities consist of the non-interest bearing mon-
etary base, i.e., the stock of currency held by the household. Changes in the stock of currency repre-
sents seigniorage, the revenue from money creation.
Real government liabilities outstanding at the end of period t− 1 in units of period t− 1 goods
are defined as lt−1 ≡ (Mt−1 + Rt−1BH,t−1) /Pt−1, similarly to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). Real
money balances in circulation are equal to mt ≡ Mt/Pt. Taken together, the government budget
constraint can be written as
lt =
Rt
πt
lt−1 −mt(Rt − 1) + Rt pH,t(ḡ− τt), (2.18)
with πt = Pt/Pt−1 being the consumer price inflation.
Monetary and fiscal policies. The model experiments will consider three alternative simple mone-
tary policy rules. In the first specification, the money supply is exogenously fixed at some constant
rate, such that the money supply evolves according to
Mt = Mt−1. (2.19)
For later comparisons this rule will be used as a benchmark, since it implies no endogenous response
of policy to economic shocks or circumstances. It further stands for a fully flexible exchange rate ar-
rangement. The second rule is characterized by a strict exchange rate peg. In that case, the central bank
fully commits to eliminate fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate,
St = St−1. (2.20)
The third monetary policy rule is a Taylor-type interest rate rule with full commitment based on Tay-
lor (1993).18 The central bank’s target for the nominal interest rate, R̄t, is described by the following
equation:
R̄t = R̄
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γπ (yt
ȳ
)γy ( St
St−1
) γe
1−γe
. (2.21)
In a setting with active monetary policy, the central bank adjusts the nominal interest rate by putting
a weight to current inflation (γπ ≥ 1), deviations from steady state output (γy ≥ 0), and to changes
in the nominal exchange rate (γe ∈ [0, 1)). When γe = 0, a purely floating exchange rate regime is
implemented. When γe ∈ (0, 1), the central bank adjust the interest rate to changes in the exchange
rate, which is called a managed float.19 In the extreme case of γe → 1, the regime represents a strict
peg. In the steady state, the target interest rate equals R̄. Following Monacelli (2004), the monetary
authority has the desire to smooth changes in the nominal interest rate at a rate ρR such that the
determination of the actual short-term nominal interest rate, Rt, can be described as follows,
Rt = (R̄t)
1−ρR (Rt−1)
ρR . (2.22)
18The rule has found wide application in the open economy context, for example in Kollmann (2002), Monacelli (2004),
Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006), or Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007).
19See Calvo and Reinhart (2002) who show that interest rate policies replace interventions in the foreign exchange market
as a device for smoothing exchange rates.
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With this rule, the central bank sets a long-run target for CPI inflation, output and the nominal ex-
change rate, and it adjusts the nominal interest rate as a feedback on short-run deviations from this
target:
Rt =
[(
Pt
Pt−1
)γπ (yt
ȳ
)γy ( St
St−1
) γe
1−γe
R̄
]1−ρR
(Rt−1)
ρR . (2.23)
Provided that monetary policy is active and γπ is above a certain threshold value, fiscal policy must
be designed to satisfy the present value budget constraint of the government for any price level in
order to obtain a unique monetary equilibrium (Leeper, 1991). This requirement can be made opera-
tional by the formulation of simple fiscal feedback rules such that either taxes or public expenditures
respond sufficiently to the level of liabilities (domestic debt or cash holdings). In the benchmark case,
a similar fiscal rule to the one suggested by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) is adopted:
τt
τ̄
=
(
lt−1
l̄
)γ1
, (2.24)
where τ̄ and l̄ are the steady state values of tax revenues and liabilities respectively, and γ1 is a
parameter which determines how the government sets tax revenues in period t in response to the
real value of total government liabilities in t− 1. It is assumed that γ1 is set in the interval (0, 2/π̄),
such that fiscal policy is passive in the sense of Leeper (1991). This assumption is justified by the
finding of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), who show that optimal fiscal policy is passive. It is a
priori indeterminate which tax rate should be adjusted when government revenues change. Here, a
purely positive approach to the problem is adopted. Following Haavelmo’s rule, two policies emerge
with this fiscal specification: First, the government only adjusts lump-sum taxes, setting τDt = τ̄
D at
all times; and second, only distortionary taxes are allowed to vary, with τLt = τ̄
L. In the following,
the focus will be laid on the latter case as a benchmark experiment.
2.4 Foreign economy
The foreign economy is large relative to the home country, hence foreign consumption equals for-
eign output and the distinction between foreign consumer price inflation and foreign CPI inflation
is unnecessary.20 It is assumed that the law of one price holds, which implies that the foreign goods
price paid by domestic households equals the foreign currency price of foreign-produced goods,
PF,t = StP∗t . If there is home bias in consumption, with γ < 1, deviations from purchasing power
parity can arise. To this end, the real exchange rate is defined asQt ≡ StP∗t /Pt. Foreign and domestic
agents share the same preferences, which implies that the consumption Euler equation determines
the foreign interest rate, given by21
y∗t
−σ = βR∗t Et
[
y∗−σt+1
π∗t+1
]
. (2.25)
20See among many others Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001), Gali and Monacelli (2005), Faia and Monacelli (2008) or
De Paoli (2009).
21See for example Divino (2009), Faia and Iliopulos (2011) and chapter 6.5 in Walsh (2010) for this approach.
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The foreign prices P∗t and output y
∗
t are represented by exogenous and independent AR(1)-processes,
log(x∗t ) = ρx log(x
∗
t−1) + (1− ρx)x̄ + ε∗x,t, for x = y, π, (2.26)
with |ρx| < 1 and εx,t ∼ N (0, σ2x) and π∗t = P∗t /P∗t−1. As the countries are symmetric in their
consumption preferences, the demand of the foreign economy for the domestically produced good
(the exports of the domestic economy) can be characterized by the following expression:
c∗H,t = γ
(
PH,t
StP∗t
)−η
y∗t . (2.27)
2.5 Equilibrium
In the equilibrium, all domestic households are identical and we have zero net-supply of domestic
bonds, BH,t = 0. The aggregate budget constraint of the domestic residents gives the evolution of
foreign debt, which evolves according to
StBF,t = R∗t−1StBF,t−1 + NXt, (2.28)
with the net exports NXt being equal to exports minus imports,
NXt = PH,tc∗H,t − PF,tcF,t. (2.29)
Aggregate employment is a continuum of the labor types, clearing the labor market with the follow-
ing condition:
nt =
∫ 1
0
nt(j)dj. (2.30)
Finally, goods market clearing in the domestic economy yields the aggregate resource constraint:
Pt(ct + it) + PH,tgt + NXt + Pt
φB
2
(StBF,t − B̄F)2 + PH,t
κ
2
(
PH,t
PH,t−1
− π̄H
)2
yt = PH,tyt. (2.31)
The competitive general equilibrium of the present model is defined as follows:22
Definition. Given the sequence of exogenous processes Z∞t=0 = {at, π∗t , y∗t }∞t=0 an equilibrium allocation of
this economy is a sequence of prices P∞t=0 = {Pt, PH,t, PF,t, P∗t , St, Rt, R∗t , Wt, Rzt}∞t=0, and quantitiesM∞t=0 =
{Λt, qt, yt, ct, it, kt, nt, Mt, BF,t, BH,t, mct, cH,t, cF,t, c∗H,t, gt, τt, τLt , τDt , lt, NXt}∞t=0 satisfying the following con-
ditions: (i) the household’s allocation solves its optimization problem; (ii) the prices of intermediate goods
producers solve their maximization problem; (iii) the final goods producer’s allocation solves its expenditure
minimization problem; (iv) the market-clearing conditions hold; (v) the government chooses a fiscal and mone-
tary policy.
The remaining part of the paper presents first the solution method and parametrization of the
given model and then turns to its quantitative implications.
22Appendix A lists the complete set of model equations.
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3 Solution method, model parametrization and welfare
The nonlinear stochastic rational expectations model is solved numerically to a second-order ap-
proximation.23 Following Kim and Kim (2003), a first-order approximation based on linear solution
methods may lead to highly misleading welfare comparisons, since the interaction of nonlinearities
and uncertainty is ignored. Instead, a second-order approximation to the full set of model equations
picks up the effects of variability on the means of consumption and leisure. For example, households
may engage in precautionary savings which affects mean consumption, or firms may hedge against
exchange rate variability by setting higher prices and lowering mean production (Bergin, Shin, and
Tchakarov, 2007).
Alternative approaches to welfare evaluation include the linear-quadratic approach developed
by Benigno and Woodford (2012), where welfare and the policymaker’s objective function can be
precisely determined from a second-order approximation to household’s utility.24 This approach
delivers an analytical representation of the policy problem. In contrast, given the absence of a closed-
form solution, the methodology adopted in this paper is based on perturbation methods and delivers
a numerical evaluation of the optimal policy problem.25
3.1 Model parametrization
The period utility function is separable in aggregate consumption, real money balances and in labor,
following Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) it takes the functional form:
U(·) = c
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ +
ϑ
1− b
(
Mt
Pt
)1−b
− χ n
1+υ
t
1 + υ
, 0 < υ, b 0 ≤ σ, χ, ϑ.
One important feature of this type of utility function is to cut down the level effect of employment
which would arise if consumption and leisure were nonseparable, so that we can focus only on the
elasticities.26 The deep structural parameters are taken from the literature (if not stated otherwise),
and the time unit is chosen to be one quarter.
For the parametrization of the model, the paper follows much of the suggestions of the business
cycle literature, with a particular focus on a typical small open economy such as Canada.27 Table
2 gives a summary of the calibrated parameter values.28 The discount factor β is set such that the
23Consider Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2008) for a detailed explanation of
the methodology.
24See also for example Sutherland (2002).
25See also Collard and Juillard (2001). For the simulation of the model I use the DYNARE implementation for Matlab
(http://www.dynare.org).
26See Guo and Harrison (2006) for a discussion on the sensitivity of the results presented in Gali (1994). The stabilizing
effect of government size on output volatility depends primarily on how hours enter the household’s period utility func-
tion. The utility function assumed in this paper is a further generalization of U2 in Guo and Harrison (2006), who assume
σ = 1.
27See for example Devereux, Lane, and Xu (2006) and Faia and Iliopulos (2011), as well as Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland
(1992), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and Dellas (2006).
28As it is not the aim of the paper to maximize the fit of the model to empirical regularities, the parameter values are to
be viewed as suggestive.
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annual steady state world interest rate is 4%. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-
sumption, σ, and real money balances, b, are equalized to the inverse labor supply elasticity, and
their value is set to σ = b = ν = 2.29 Real money balances are introduced to the household’s utility
function to generate a money demand equation. Following Kollmann (2005), the weight of money
balances, ϑ, is set at a very small number, so that money is (essentially) neutral under flexible prices.
Moreover, this calibration allows us to focus only on the volatility of consumption and labor for the
welfare analysis. The weight of labor in the utility function, χ, matches the amount of hours the
households devote to work. It is assumed that one third of the total time endowment is for work, i.e.,
n̄ = 1/3. In the benchmark parametrization in Table 2, χ then equals 31.1.
Table 2: Benchmark parameters
Parameter Value Description
Structural Parameters
β 1.04−0.25 Subjective discount factor (quarterly)
σ 2 Risk aversion
ν 2 Inverse Frish labor supply elasticity
ϑ 1 ∗ 10−6 Utility weight on money balances
χ 31.1 Utility weight on leisure
b 2 Intertemporal elasticity of substitution of money balances
η 1.5 Elasticity of substitution between h and f Consumption
ψBF 0.0019 Portfolio adjustment cost
γ 0.4 Share of foreign good in the consumption basket
ε 8 Elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods
κ 50 Price adjustment cost parameter
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
α 0.36 Capital share
ψK 15 Capital adjustment cost
Government size
sg [0.2, 0.4, 0.6] Output share of public expenditures
τD [0.2, 0.4, 0.6] Distortionary taxes
Steady State values
n̄ 1/3 Steady state hours worked
π̄ 1 Steady state inflation
Exogenous Processes
ρa, σεa 0.9571, 0.0074 Domestic technology shock
ρy∗ , σε∗y 0.9911, 0.0086 Foreign output shock
ρπ∗ , σε∗π 0.8777, 0.0028 Foreign inflation shock
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods has been discussed extensively
and studies have estimated quite a range for this parameter. Traditionally, the business cycle litera-
ture has assumed an elasticity of 1.5, while empirical research has found values for high frequency
data ranging from 0.2 to 3.5.30 The benchmark model relies on the commonly used value and sets
η = 1.5, but sensitivity analysis for this and other parameters will be carried out in Section 5. As
in Gali and Monacelli (2005), the degree of openness γ equals 0.4. This value corresponds to the
29Changing the values of σ and b does not change the qualitative implications of the main result presented in Table 3. By
contrast, the labor supply elasticity plays a crucial role for the results, as will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.
30See for example Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2001) and Collard and Dellas (2002)
for theoretical contributions and Shiells, Stern, and Deardorff (1986) for an empirical investigation.
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Canadian share of imports in GDP, which amounts to roughly 40%. Following Kollmann (2002),
the portfolio adjustment cost function reads ΨB(StBF,t)) =
ψB
2 St(BF,t − B̄F)2 and the parameter on
portfolio adjustment costs is set to ψBF = 0.0019.
31
The elasticity of substitution among the different varieties of goods in the domestic economy, ε,
is 8, which implies a steady state markup of 15%, a value also used in Faia and Iliopulos (2011).
The parameter governing the cost of price adjustment, κ, is set to be in line with the dynamics of
the standard Calvo price adjustment process. As Keen and Wang (2007) show, if ε is equal to 8 and
assuming a price adjustment on average every 4 quarters, then κ is around 50. Following Bergin,
Shin, and Tchakarov (2007), the depreciation rate, δ = 0.025 and the capital share in the production
function is α = 0.36. The capital adjustment cost function is standard in the literature and reads
ΨK(it, kt) =
ψK
2
(
it
kt − δ
)2
kt. The capital adjustment cost parameter, ψK = 15, is taken from Kollmann
(2002).
Government size. In line with Gali (1994), Andrés and Doménech (2006) and Andrés, Doménech, and
Fatas (2008), two specific measures of government size are considered. On the expenditure side,
government size is characterized by the share of public consumption expenditures in total GDP,
denoted by sg. The revenue side measures government size with the amount of distortionary income
taxes being levied, τD. Following the evidence reported in Table 1, the average share of government
spending in GDP, sg, is set to 0.4 for the benchmark experiment. The income tax rate equals the share
of public spending, i.e. τD = sg = 0.40. This value represents approximately the median of the
expenditure and revenue share found in the data between 1970 and 2010. A small government is
defined to have a consumption share and level of distortionary taxes of 20%, which is half of the
benchmark and corresponds approximately to the data estimates of 1950-70 reported in Table 1. A
large government devotes 60% of GDP to government consumption and levies an income tax of 60%,
which is in correspondence with the maximum government size found in the data between 1990-
2010. The level of lump-sum taxes (transfers) τL = 0 in the benchmark specification and γ1 is set to
0.25 following Moldovan (2010).
Steady state and stochastic components. For the benchmark economy, inflation is zero in the steady state,
i.e., π̄ = 1, which leads to P̄ = P̄H = P̄F = P̄∗ = π̄ = π̄∗ = π̄H = ¯rer = µ̄ = 1 and R = R∗ = π̄β .
32
The stochastic components of the model are calibrated to the Canadian (Home) and the US (For-
eign) economies. The quarterly data series cover a sample period from 1960:1–2012:4. An AR(1)-
process of linearly detrended (log) labor productivity in Canada fits the exogenous process of pro-
ductivity, yielding the following estimates (with standard error given in parentheses):33
at = 0.9569
(0.0165)
at−1 + εa,t, σεa = 0.0074. (3.1)
31I have tested the underlying model for different values of these parameters. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) use a
value of 0.0007 for ψBF . Using this higher value would not affect the key results in Table 3. Also, changing the parameter
of openness to a value of 0.1, as for example used in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) does not have any qualitative
implications for the results.
32Mostly for practical reasons it has been common in the New Keynesian literature to assume a zero-inflation steady
state. Notable exceptions are for example King and Wolman (1996), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), Ascari (2004) and
Ascari and Ropele (2007).
33I have estimated the three exogenous processes also with 4 lags. Qualitatively, the results remain unaffected.
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In order to calibrate the sources of stochastic volatility in the rest of the world, quarterly data on
linearly detrended US (log-) output and the demeaned log-difference of the US GDP deflator are
used. Estimation yields the following results:
y∗t = 0.9911
(0.0129)
y∗t−1 + εy∗,t, σε∗y = 0.0086 (3.2)
π∗t = 0.8777
(0.0332)
π∗t−1 + επ∗,t, σε∗π = 0.0028. (3.3)
3.2 Welfare measure
Following the literature, a second-order Taylor expansion of the utility function of a representative
household around the deterministic steady state, indicated here by overbars, is computed. Home
welfare is defined as34
W0,t ≡ E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βtU(ct, nt)
}
, (3.4)
or in recursive form
W0,t = U(ct, nt) + βW0,t+1, (3.5)
in which U(ct, nt) denotes the household’s period instantaneous utility neglecting the holding of real
money balances.35
The exchange rate arrangements are compared based on a compensating measure given by the
fraction Θ of household consumption that would be needed to equate conditional welfare WRule0,t
under the studied exchange rate policy (money supply or Taylor rule) to the level of welfare WPeg0,t
implied by the strict exchange rate peg. Hence, Θ should satisfy the following expression:
E0
{
∞
∑
t=0
βtU((1 + Θ)ct, nt)
}
=WPeg0,t . (3.6)
With the specification of utility given in Section 3.1, one can solve for Θ and obtain:
Θ =
{(
WPeg0,t −W
Rule
0,t
)
(1− β)(1− σ) + 1
} 1
1−σ − 1. (3.7)
Note that a value of Θ < 0 stands for a welfare loss of pegging the exchange rate, i.e., the household
would have to be payed the fraction Θ (% of consumption) to move from a chosen monetary policy
regime to a strict peg. To solve for the reaction parameters (ρR, γπ, γy, γe) in the policy rule presented
in equation (2.21), the contingent plans for consumption and hours of work associated with that
policy must yield the highest level of unconditional lifetime utility in the home economy (Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe, 2007).
34The chosen welfare metric is based on conditional expected discounted utility of the representative household. This
takes into account the transition dynamics from the deterministic steady state (the initial condition of the model) to the
different stochastic steady states implied by the alternative monetary policy rules. See for example Faia and Monacelli
(2007) or Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007).
35In principle, real money balances are in the utility function of the household to generate a demand for money. Follow-
ing Dellas (2006), the utility weight on money is parametrized such to be basically useless. Therefore, it is also abstracted
from reporting the variance of real money balances in Section 4.2 as they do not matter in size for the welfare calculation.
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4 Quantifying the effect of government size and the exchange rate regime
This section first shows the welfare results arising from a change in monetary policy and the exchange
rate arrangement as a function of public sector size. It explains the results by analyzing the effect of
government size and the exchange rate regime on business cycle volatility and model dynamics. The
sources of uncertainty driving the business cycle are the domestic productivity shock and the two
foreign shocks to output and price inflation.
4.1 Welfare
Table 3 summarizes the main results of the paper. The rate of change of the net welfare gains from
exchange rate flexibility increase with public sector size. For both exchange rate arrangements con-
sidered in the benchmark experiments, increasing government size yields higher welfare costs of
implementing a strict exchange rate peg. When the size of the public sector amounts to 20% of GDP,
the welfare gains of flexible exchange rates are similar both under fully flexible and managed float-
ing exchange rates. However, when government size increases, the managed floating exchange rate
regime exhibits lower welfare costs than the purely floating arrangement.
Table 3: Welfare costs of implementing strict peg
Government size(ii)
Exchange rate policy(i) 20% 40% 60%
Fully flexible(iii) -2.42 -3.46 -6.97
Managed float(iv) -2.48 -3.65 -7.78
Note: (i) Welfare costs are stated in per-cent of steady state con-
sumption. (ii) sg = τD. (iii) The fully flexible exchange rate
regime is characterized by a money supply rule as specified in
equation 2.19. (iv) The managed float is characterized by an op-
timal simple Taylor rule given by equation 2.21.
To gain intuition on these results, the different exchange rate policies can be compared by comput-
ing the welfare gains ϑPolicy of a particular exchange rate arrangement expressed by the percentage
change in permanent consumption relative to the deterministic steady state such that the representa-
tive household is indifferent between being in a particular exchange rate regime and the deterministic
steady state of the economy.36 Formally,
WPolicy0,t = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βtU(cPolicyt , n
Policy
t ) =
∞
∑
t=0
βtU((1 + ϑPolicy)c̄, n̄). (4.1)
The second-order expansion of the period utility functions is given by
E[U(ct, nt)] = Ū + c̄1−σ
(
E[ĉt]−
1
2
σ Var[ĉt]
)
− χn̄1+ν
(
E[n̂t] +
1
2
ν Var[n̂t]
)
, (4.2)
36Note that when ϑPolicy < 0 it is a welfare cost of fluctuations. Compare Lucas (1987, 2003) for a description on the
evaluation of the welfare costs of business cycles.
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then, solving equation 4.1 for ϑPolicy yields
ϑPolicy =
[
1 + (1− σ)
(
E[ĉt]−
1
2
σ Var[ĉt]− χ
n̄1+ν
c̄1−σ
(
E[n̂t] +
1
2
ν Var[n̂t]
))] 1
1−σ
− 1. (4.3)
Similar to Kollmann (2002), Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007) or Evers (2012), the welfare metric
ϑPolicy can be decomposed into its mean and variance components, ϑM and ϑV , where (1 + ϑ
Policy) =
(1 + ϑM)(1 + ϑV). Similarly, these two components can be further decomposed into the components
corresponding to consumption and hours worked.
Table 4 summarizes the results arising from this exercise. The first row reports the value of the
unconditional expected lifetime utility. The second row shows the associated overall welfare costs
of eliminating the business cycles for the three monetary policy rules specified in Section 2.3. These
costs are disentangled into their mean and variance components and further into the respective con-
tributions attributed to consumption and hours worked.37
Table 4: Welfare comparisons of different exchange rate arrangements
Statistic(i) Fully flexible Strict peg Managed float
Government size(ii) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2(1) 0.4(2) 0.6(3)
Expected utility -100.27 -181.51 -353.77 -102.89 -185.39 -362.42 -100.35 -181.72 -354.75
Welfare gain ϑPolicy -1.72 -2.98 -7.03 -8.95 -11.29 -22.23 -1.90 -1.91 -2.00
Mean contribution ϑM -0.18 -0.28 -0.46 -0.08 0.04 0.35 -0.23 -0.22 -0.21
Consumption -0.15 -0.21 -0.34 0.19 0.30 0.57 0.00 0.01 0.02
Hours worked -0.04 -0.06 -0.12 -0.27 -0.26 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.23
Variance contribution ϑV -1.54 -2.70 -6.58 -8.87 -11.33 -22.57 -1.67 -1.69 -1.79
Consumption -1.25 -2.27 -5.78 -2.85 -5.94 -17.90 -0.34 -0.38 -0.45
Hours worked -0.29 -0.43 -0.81 -6.06 -5.46 -4.84 -1.33 -1.31 -1.33
Note: (i) Welfare costs are stated in per-mil of steady state consumption. (ii) sg = τD. (1) ρR = 0.12, γy = 0.23, γπ =
1.14, γe = 0.02. (2) ρR = 0, γy = 4.98, γπ = 2.24, γe = 0.62. (3) ρR = 0, γy = 4.99, γπ = 2.27, γe = 0.63.
Four essential points emerge: First, the managed floating regime characterized by the optimal
simple rule yields lower welfare losses than both the fully flexible regime and the exchange rate
peg when government size is large. For a small size of the public sector, the fully flexible exchange
rate regime (the money supply rule), exhibits lower welfare costs than the other arrangements. For
instance, when government size takes on its benchmark value of 40% and the central bank follows
the managed floating interest rate rule, the welfare cost of households amounts to 1.91 per mil of
their permanent consumption stream. Under a peg these costs are 11.29 per mil and under a money
supply rule approximately 3 per mil.
Second, the difference in welfare gains becomes wider the larger the size of the public sector.
When the public sector is small, i.e., amounts to 20% of GDP, the optimal simple rule exhibits only
slightly higher welfare costs than the money supply rule (-1.90 vs. -1.72), but when government
size is large, the welfare costs of implementing such a rule are more than three times those of the
37The exchange rate policies outlined in Section 2.3 give rise to the same non-stochastic steady state.
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optimal rule (-2.00 vs -7.03). Under all sizes of the public sector the exchange rate peg is welfare-
inferior to a monetary regime with floating exchanges rates. Relative to the optimal rule, the costs of
implementing a peg are more than four times as large when government size is small (-1.90 vs. -8.95)
and exceed a factor of eleven times larger when the public sector has a size of 60% (-2.00 vs. -22.23).
Third, the estimated reaction parameters of the optimal simple rule depend substantially on the
size of government. When the government is small, the monetary authority responds to inflation
with a coefficient of γπ = 1.14, when the government is large, this coefficient amounts to 2.27. Also
output stabilization gains importance with increasing government size. The interest-rate-smoothing
parameter varies between 0 and 0.12, which are low values compared with the existing literature.
Section 5.2 will discuss in detail the role of the monetary policy rule and the robustness of these
findings. The coefficient on stabilizing fluctuations in the change of the nominal exchange rate, γe, is
found to increase sharply with government size. Consistent with the findings of Laxton and Pesenti
(2003), the exchange rate is only of minor importance when government size is small. Importantly
however, stabilizing the exchange rate gains importance as soon as the size of government gets large.
Fourth, it is mainly the variance contribution which matters for the welfare results. The mean ef-
fect in the welfare cost measure is negligibly small, which implies that the reported welfare properties
are fundamentally related to variations in consumption and hours worked. For all model specifica-
tions, the variance components are increasing in government size. Under the fully floating regime
and the exchange rate peg, the variance of consumption accounts for a larger share than the one of
hours worked. This is reversed, when the optimal rule is implemented. Related to the evidence re-
ported in Baxter and Stockman (1989), it is evident that both the variance of consumption and that of
hours worked are substantially larger under pegged exchange rates.
In summary, welfare costs of changing the exchange rate regime from flexible to fixed increase
with government size. As the steady state is the same across exchange rate policies, this result has
to come from the implied volatility of hours and consumption. This volatility is the result of the
propagation of endogenous variables to the various shocks. To gain a deeper understanding of the
main results, it is instructive to study how the size of the public sector and the selection of the ex-
change rate regime affect the volatility and dynamics of selected variables in the presence of the
three exogenous driving forces. For this purpose, the paper first analyzes the volatility of output and
the welfare-relevant variables, i.e., consumption and hours worked, for different calibrations of the
public sector and the different monetary policies under consideration, while holding constant the
remaining parameters of the economy.
4.2 Volatility
Figure 2 reports separately the volatility of output, consumption and hours worked for either a fixed
exchange rate regime (light grey), the money supply rule with flexible exchange rates (solid black) or
the optimal simple rule with a managed float (dark grey) for different sizes of the public sector. Note
that the standard errors have been normalized to unity at sg = 0.2. For all specifications it is assumed
that the size of public expenditures equals the size of public revenues, i.e., sg = τD.
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Figure 2: Volatility of output, consumption and hours for different sizes of government
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Focusing on the results for output (i.e., the first column in Figure 2) the results suggest that output
volatility is negatively linked to public sector size. Consistent with the findings of Gali (1994), Guo
and Harrison (2006) and Andrés, Doménech, and Fatas (2008), output volatility is highest when the
government is small and decreases with increasing government size. Here, the paper adds to their
results by showing the importance of the monetary policy and exchange rate regime in place. For
a government size below 20%, the exchange rate peg exhibits lower output volatility than the other
two regimes, although the difference is small (around 0.5 percent). However, when the size of the
public sector gets large, we observe that an exchange rate peg exerts a less stabilizing effect on output
volatility. Moreover, the difference in volatility increases with government size. When government
size reaches 80%, the standard deviation of output is 4.3 percent lower under a money supply and
even 18.9 percent when the optimal simple rule is implemented.
Focusing on consumption (second column in Figure 2), the figure shows that consumption volatil-
ity monotonically increases with government size, but the rate of increase depends strongly on the
monetary policy in place. Consumption volatility increases only slightly when the optimal rule is in
place. For instance, when government size rises from 20% to 60%, the standard deviation increases by
three percent. For low shares of government spending and tax revenues, the money supply rule and
exchange rate peg exhibit lower volatility than the optimal rule. Yet, as government size increases,
the difference in the standard deviation of consumption gets increasingly large, especially under the
pegged exchange rate regime. In comparison to the optimal rule, when government size amounts
to 60%, consumption volatility is about 1.5 times larger under a money supply rule and almost 2.5
times larger under an exchange rate peg.
The third column reports the standard deviation of hours worked for different sizes of the public
sector. Evidently, there is substantial variation across monetary policies. We first observe the sta-
bilizing role of government size under floating exchange rates. Under both the money supply and
the optimal rule, the standard deviation of hours worked monotonically decreases with government
size. On the contrary, when the exchange rate is pegged, volatility of hours worked is an increasing
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function of public sector size.
Table 5: Variance decomposition
Fully flexible Strict peg Managed float
at y∗t π
∗
t at y
∗
t π
∗
t at y
∗
t π
∗
t
sg = τD = 0.2 yt 86.31 0.52 13.17 8.01 2.31 89.68 73.10 11.02 15.87
ct 69.56 10.06 20.39 36.14 10.93 52.93 43.73 16.38 39.88
nt 90.19 0.51 9.30 4.84 2.51 92.65 97.38 1.05 1.57
sg = τD = 0.4 yt 85.28 0.63 14.09 7.87 2.19 89.94 72.53 10.05 17.42
ct 77.63 7.37 14.99 30.59 6.69 62.72 46.86 15.51 37.63
nt 93.54 0.37 6.08 8.30 2.32 89.37 97.73 0.80 1.46
sg = τD = 0.6 yt 83.38 0.82 15.80 7.52 2.10 90.39 71.89 8.73 19.38
ct 85.46 4.82 9.71 25.99 3.72 70.30 52.89 14.23 32.88
nt 96.50 0.23 3.27 17.20 2.05 80.76 98.23 0.53 1.24
Note: The numbers indicate the asymptotic variance decomposition at an infinite horizon, expressed in percent. yt is out-
put, ct is consumption, and nt is hours worked. The asymmetric shocks are domestic technology, at, foreign output, y∗t
and foreign inflation, π∗t . The underlying calibration is as shown in Table 2.
Figure 2 gives a first insight as to why the welfare costs reported in Table 3 increase with public
sector size. In order to understand the sources of the observed volatility, Table 5 reports the uncondi-
tional variance decomposition for the benchmark economy under the alternative monetary policies.
Three exogenous shocks in the form of calibrated AR(1)-processes are considered: A domestic tech-
nology shock, at, a foreign output shock, y∗t , and a foreign inflation shock, π
∗
t . Under a money supply
rule, the dominant source of fluctuations is the domestic supply shock, accounting for more than 95%
of output volatility. Similarly, the technology shock accounts for more than 85% of output volatility
under the Taylor rule. In contrast, when the exchange rate is pegged, then the foreign price shock
plays the most important role, accounting for more than 90% of GDP volatility.
The intuition for these results can be provided by studying the uncovered interest parity condi-
tion. The combination of the Euler equations from domestic and foreign bond holdings yields:
Rt(1 + φ′B(BF,t)) = R
∗
t Et [∆St+1] , (4.4)
relating the domestic nominal interest rate to the foreign nominal interest rate. In the long run, the
domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate, while in the short run, the expected change in
the nominal exchange rate captures deviations in the interest rates. The portfolio adjustment costs
alter the uncovered interest parity condition from the one given by complete financial markets.38
Under flexible exchange rates, the expected change in the nominal exchange rate dampens the impact
of foreign shocks to the domestic economy and the home country is mainly affected by domestic
disturbances. By contrast, when the central bank fixes the rate of exchange, the domestic interest
rate equals the foreign interest rate, so that foreign inflation shocks get transmitted to the domestic
interest rate.
38The standard uncovered interest parity relationship can be derived by log-linearization (See Gali and Monacelli (2005)
for details).
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The effect of government size on the variance decomposition of output is minor, however, gov-
ernment size has sizable effects on the variance decomposition of consumption on hours. Under
flexible exchange rates, the impact of foreign shocks on consumption is reduced when government
size increases. On the other hand, the role of the domestic supply shock diminishes with increas-
ing government size under pegged exchange rates. Concerning hours of work, we observe that the
domestic technology shock gains importance with increasing government size under all monetary
policy specifications.
4.3 Dynamics
To shed light on the preceding results, it is useful to inspect the model dynamics. In a first step, the
discussion will focus on how these depend upon the size of the public sector. To establish a bench-
mark, it is assumed that monetary policy follows an exogenous money supply rule with completely
flexible exchange rates. As follows from Table 5, the domestic technology shock is the main driving
force under such a policy. To this end, impulse response functions (IRFS) for a selection of variables
corresponding to a one percent increase in domestic technology are reported. To investigate the role
of government size, the dynamics under different calibrations of the public sector are compared. In
a second step, the implications of changing the exchange rate policy to a strict peg are discussed and
a link between government size and the exchange rate regime is established.
4.3.1 Floating exchange rates
Figure 3 shows the dynamic responses of selected variables for the benchmark calibration and for
a small and large government respectively.39 The benchmark is indicated by solid black lines. A
positive shock to domestic technology raises output and lowers prices. Since there is monopolistic
competition among intermediate goods producing firms and price adjustments are costly, firms save
on labor demand, causing hours worked to fall. The increase in output brings about an increase in
consumption demand.
The central bank implements a constant money supply rule and allows for floating exchange
rates. The fall in domestic inflation implies an increase in the demand for real money balances,
causing the nominal exchange rate to appreciate. With such a rule, the nominal money transfers
from the central bank to the government (seignorage) are constant. Government liabilities increase
by a sizable amount and remain persistently above the steady state for 20 quarters. At the same time,
the government budget displays a surplus. Although income taxes decrease persistently, government
revenues increase, while government spending remains constant.
The role of government size can be highlighted by comparing the impulse responses for differ-
ent calibrations of the public sector (sg and τd). This result is also depicted in Figure 3. A large
government implies lower dynamics of output. Hours worked, consumption and real money bal-
ances are more responsive when the public sector is large. The nominal exchange rate appreciates
39The dynamics to a foreign output shock (Figure 6) and a foreign inflation shock (Figure 7) are reported in the appendix.
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more strongly and government liabilities increase more compared to the benchmark case. The lower
response of output under a large government implies lower tax revenues such that fiscal revenues
increase more the smaller the public sector.
Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1% domestic productivity shock, varying government size
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Composition effect. To better understand the effects of government size on volatility and dynam-
ics, it is instructive to disentangle the public sector into its expenditure side, sg, and revenue side, τD.
First, the increase in public spending affects the economy through a composition effect which is closely
linked to the automatic stabilization properties of government size.40 In short, the composition ef-
fect captures the following: Larger governments reduce the volatility of output because government
spending is not volatile itself. Increasing the size of that (non-volatile) component of GDP decreases
ceteris paribus the overall volatility (see also Figure 2). Consider the aggregate resource constraint
40For a detailed discussion see e.g. Andrés and Doménech (2006) and Andrés, Doménech, and Fatas (2008).
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given by equation (2.31) in log-linearized form
ŷt = sc ĉt + si ît + sg ĝt +
(
sg − 1
)
p̂H,t. (4.5)
Note that the present experiment assumes constant government spending, such that ĝt = 0. Chang-
ing the share of public purchases, sg, means changing the composition of the aggregate demand
components (sc, si), which both depend negatively upon the size of government spending. The ex-
pression
(
sg − 1
)
p̂H,t arises because government spending has full home bias. It captures the fact that
the government is immune to exchange rate risk as its expenditures are paid in domestic currency
only. The response of domestic prices amplifies the composition effect, as the elasticity on devia-
tions in the domestic price level
(
sg − 1
)
decreases with government size.41 Following a domestic
supply shock, the fall in domestic prices has a stronger positive effect on aggregate demand when
government size is small. While output volatility is reduced by the composition effect, the volatility
of private consumption is substantially enhanced. As the non-volatile public sector increases, the
private sector is forced to absorb a larger fraction of the volatility in the economy. Taken together, the
composition effect provides an explanation for the dampened response of output and the stronger
reaction of consumption when government expenditures are large. However, the composition effect
is not sufficient to understand why welfare decreases with public sector size.
Labor supply effect. The role of income tax rates, τD, is studied next. The size of the tax distortion
has a direct impact on consumption and the labor supply decision. On the one hand, variations
in income taxes give rise to a typical wealth effect. As can be observed in Figure 3, lowering τD
directly expands after tax income, untightening thereby the household’s budget constraint and thus
amplifying the consumption schedule. On the other hand, the tax-elasticity τ
D
1−τD increases with the
level of taxes.
νn̂t = −σĉt + ŵt −
τD
1− τD τ̂
D
t . (4.6)
Hence, as equation (4.6) shows, an increase in the size of public revenues leads to a higher impact of
changes in the tax rate and thus on the labor supply decision of households, i.e., destabilizing hours
worked. Note that changes in government size (on the revenue or expenditure side) do not affect the
labor supply elasticity, ν. As shown by Guo and Harrison (2006), the results reported in Gali (1994)
essentially depend on the assumption of the household’s period utility function and the associated
employment effect. Under the log-log preference specification of Gali (1994), the calibration of public
sector size determines the elasticity of labor supply through steady state adjustments of employment,
which results in the main driver of his results. To shut down the employment effect of government
size, Guo and Harrison (2006) suggest to use a convex preference specification, similar to the one used
in this paper. It has the advantage of featuring an inverse Frish labor supply elasticity, 1ν , which is
independent of n̄. The preference specification used herein is a further generalization of the one used
41The model has been tested under the assumption that the government consumes the aggregate final good rather than
only the domestically produced good, that is it pays Ptgt. Under this assumption, the qualitative nature of the results does
not change. In comparison to the benchmark, net welfare gains of flexible exchange rates are larger. They remain increasing
in government size.
24
in Guo and Harrison (2006) and further allows to test the model implications for different degrees of
consumption smoothing. As we shall see in Section 5, the assumptions on the degree of labor supply
elasticity and intertemporal elasticity of substitution have quantitative effects on the main results,
but qualitatively, the results are robust to any specification.
4.3.2 Pegging the exchange rate
The labor supply equation (4.6), and in particular the size and dynamics of the income tax rate, fun-
damentally relates to the question of how the exchange rate regime affects model dynamics, volatility
and thus the welfare results presented in Table 3.
Figure 4: Impulse responses to a 1% domestic productivity shock, comparing exchange rate policies
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Benchmark under floating exchange rates
The starting point for understanding the government’s tax policy is to consider the government
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budget constraint provided in Equation 2.18 and the fiscal rule in Equation 2.24.42 The government
generates revenues from taxing the household’s labor and capital income, from interest payments
on issued bonds and from seignorage.43 The fiscal rule in place stipulates that any positive (nega-
tive) deviation of government liabilities (interest bearing domestic bonds plus non-interest bearing
money holdings) in the previous period from its long run value leads to an increase (decrease) in tax
revenues that the government should collect (γ1 > 0). If the central bank runs an exogenous money
supply rule and allows for a flexible exchange rate, then seignorage revenues are constant and do not
affect the government’s budget (as depicted in Figure 3). In turn, when the monetary authority cred-
ibly pegs the exchange rate, the money stock in the economy has to be adjusted, rendering money
supply endogenous and generating seignorage revenues to the government. Consequently, the gov-
ernment can hold less debt, explaining why liabilities increase less strongly. Moreover, the additional
revenue gives the government the ability to reduce income taxes and still generate a primary surplus.
Figure 4 depicts this mechanism and allows to compare the benchmark dynamics of Figure 3 under
floating exchange rates with its counterpart under an exchange rate peg and for different calibrations
of government size.
Under an exchange rate peg, the response of output to a technology shock is stronger than under
the float. In order to maintain the exchange rate peg credible and counter the pressure of appre-
ciation, the monetary authority increases money supply (as shown by the response of real money
balances), reducing thereby also the downward pressure on CPI inflation. Figure 4 shows that the
government generates revenues from money creation on impact, although the effect is small and not
persistent. We observe that the response of government liabilities is smaller, given the fact that the
government holds less debt to finance its expenditures than under a floating regime. Further, the
government can reduce income taxes by a larger amount, which in turn leads to a more pronounced
response of consumption and a smaller reduction in hours worked. The implications of changing the
size of the government purchases are the same as under floating exchange rates.
To sum up, public sector size affects the results reported in Table 3 through two main channels.
On the one hand, we observe a composition effect, reducing the volatility of output by automatic sta-
bilization, but increasing substantially the volatility of consumption. This effect is enhanced under
pegged exchange rates, where the monetary authority looses a policy instrument and is forced to
adjust money supply endogenously to unexpected shocks. The additional seignorage revenues dis-
tort the tax decision of the government and generate more volatility in the private sector. On the
other hand, we observe a labor supply effect. Essentially, changes in monetary policy play a central
role in the tax decision of the government, which affects the labor supply decision of the households
and generates additional volatility in hours worked. The large differences in welfare costs across
exchange rate regimes are an outcome of these mechanisms in which government size plays a crucial
role.
42The government sets deviations of lump-sum taxes to zero, (τ̂L = 0).
43Importantly, as it is common to low-inflation developed countries, seignorage adds little to total government revenues.
Similar to what is observed in the data, the steady state share of seignorage in GDP ( m̄ȳ ) equals 0.62%.
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5 Discussion of the results
This section discusses the sensitivity of the results presented above by varying assumptions about
three main dimensions of the benchmark model. The first concerns fiscal policy, in particular the
effect of distortionary taxation and the fiscal rule in place. Second, it has been shown that monetary
policy operated by an optimal simple interest rate rule yields the best welfare properties. This section
discusses in detail how these results depend upon the specification of such a policy rule. Finally, the
benchmark parametrization depends upon values taken from the related literature. This section will
provide insights on how the results depend on changes in the parameter values, with a particular
focus on labor supply elasticity and the degree of trade openness. Overall, the results are qualitatively
robust to the different changes in policies and parametrization. However, depending on the fiscal
and monetary policy in place, or the parametrization assumed, there can be substantial quantitative
differences in the welfare costs of adopting a peg as a function of public sector size.
5.1 The role of fiscal policy
The analysis of the benchmark model with distortionary income taxation has delivered two central
results. The welfare costs of adopting an exchange rate peg increase with public sector size and the
main drivers of these costs are the composition and labor supply effects. Therefore, an important role
in determining the welfare costs corresponds to the assumptions on fiscal policy, i.e., the tax policy
and fiscal rule that are implemented.
Table 6: Welfare costs of exchange rate peg, comparing fiscal policies
Exchange rate policy(i) Benchmark Lump-sum taxation Expenditure rule
Government size(ii) 20% 40% 60% 20% 40% 60% 20% 40% 60%
Fully flexible(iii) -2.42 -3.46 -6.97 -2.46 -3.72 -6.62 -2.72 -4.51 -9.20
Managed float(iv) -2.48 -3.65 -7.78 -2.52 -3.88 -7.15 -2.76 -4.55 -9.15
Note: (i) The welfare gain Θ is the % fraction of consumption required to equate welfare under any given policy to
the one obtained under a peg. (ii) sg = τD. (iii) The fully flexible exchange rate regime is characterized by a money
supply rule as specified in equation 2.19. (iv) The managed float is characterized by an optimal simple Taylor rule
given by equation 2.21.
5.1.1 Distortionary vs. lump-sum taxation
When the government chooses its tax policy to be lump-sum (τ̂dt = τ̄
D) rather than distortionary
(τ̂Lt = τ̄
L), the labor supply equation in log-linearized terms reads
νn̂t = −σĉt + ŵt. (5.1)
In that case, the labor supply effect of distortionary taxation vanishes. In particular, the income tax
rate affects the welfare results solely through its negative level effect on the steady state of labor.
If government spending is financed through time-varying lump-sum taxes, then the exchange rate
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policy affects the dynamics of lump-sum taxes rather than the distortionary tax rate, which in turn
affects directly the household’s budget constraint but not the labor supply decision. Consequently,
hours worked are less volatile and the welfare costs of adopting an exchange rate peg are significantly
lower.
The second column of Table 6 compares the welfare costs arising from a lump-sum tax policy to
the benchmark results presented in Section 4. Two points are important to highlight here. First, net
welfare gains of flexible exchange rates remain increasing in government size under both the fully
flexible and managed floating exchange rate arrangement. Second, compared to the benchmark, the
welfare costs of implementing a peg are slightly higher when the government is small, but substan-
tially lower as the public sector gets large. A closer inspection of the variance contribution, reported
in Table 7, reveals that the composition effect outweighs the labor supply effect. Even though taxes
no longer distort the labor supply decision, it can be seen that the variance of consumption largely
increases with public sector size.
5.1.2 Revenue vs. expenditure rule
So far it has been assumed that fiscal policy is designed by a rule which stipulates that tax revenues
adjust to the level of government liabilities observed in the past period. However, it can be argued
that cyclical changes in tax rates are not very realistic.44 Moreover, empirical evidence on fiscal con-
solidations in industrialized countries indicates that fiscal rules have been more successful when
based on adjustments in government spending rather than adjustments in the tax rate.45 Therefore,
as a robustness exercise, a fiscal rule similar to the one of Andrés and Doménech (2006) is adopted.
With such a rule, the deviation of public spending from its long-run value is a function of the devia-
tion of the past liabilities from its target:
gt
ḡ
=
(
lt−1
l̄
)−γ1
. (5.2)
With an expenditure rule the government lowers its spending when last period’s government liabil-
ities have been above their steady state value, i.e., −γ1. This is in contrast to the parametrization
of the benchmark experiment, where tax revenues were raised instead. With setting γ1 = 0.25 it is
ensured that fiscal policy under this rule is passive.46 Under such a policy, the tax instruments τL, τD
are both set constant at their long-run values, and government spending is the only fiscal variable
allowed to adjust.
The welfare results of changing the fiscal rule are summarized in the last column of Table 6. First,
it is shown that also under this fiscal specification the net welfare gains of flexible exchange rates
increase with government size. However, compared to the benchmark, the welfare costs of adopting
a peg are substantially higher under a revenue rule. Considering the welfare costs of eliminating the
44Furthermore, distortionary taxes may, under some circumstances, lead to multiple (sunspot) equilibria, inducing ad-
ditional instability (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 1997).
45See for instance Alesina and Perotti (1995) or Alesina and Ardagna (2010).
46To provide equivalence and comparability of the expenditure and revenue rule, the value of γ1 is set such that the
half-life response of output to the domestic technology shock, i.e., after 20 periods, is equal under the two rules.
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business cycle and the variance contributions presented in Table 7, it can be seen that this is the result
of substantially lower aggregate volatility.
With constant taxation (lump-sum and distortionary), deviations in fiscal revenues are propor-
tional to deviations in output. A domestic supply shock causes ceteris paribus an increase of output,
i.e., income, thus raising fiscal revenues. The government can reduce its debt holdings causing total
government liabilities to decrease. Given the fiscal rule of equation 5.2, government spending in-
creases. This procyclical pattern of government spending induces a demand effect, diminishing the
downward pressure on prices following the technology shock. Further, the increase in government
spending affects the household’s consumption and labor decision through a typical wealth effect. The
exchange rate policy affects this mechanism mainly through the demand side effect of fiscal policy.
Under a floating regime, domestic prices fall in response to a technology shock and the nominal ex-
change rate is allowed to depreciate. These dynamics are mitigated by procyclical fiscal expenditures.
When the exchange rate is pegged instead, monetary policy is exogenous, implying an amplification
of the demand side effects of procyclical fiscal policy, increasing the volatility in prices. This increase
in volatility feeds into hours and consumption, therefore destabilizing the whole economy.
Table 7: Welfare compensation and variance contribution for different fiscal policies
Statistic(i) Fully flexible Strict peg Managed float
Government size(ii) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
Benchmark
Welfare ϑPolicy -1.72 -2.98 -7.04 -8.93 -11.25 -22.09 -1.90 -1.91 -2.00
Fixed distortionary taxes
Welfare ϑPolicy -1.60 -2.27 -3.37 -7.94 -8.02 -9.16 -1.89 -1.91 -2.01
Consumption ϑV,c -1.09 -1.50 -2.16 -2.41 -3.69 -6.04 -0.34 -0.39 -0.49
Hours worked ϑV,n -0.32 -0.51 -0.85 -5.48 -4.37 -3.29 -1.32 -1.30 -1.31
Expenditure rule
Welfare ϑPolicy -1.22 -1.28 -1.43 -8.24 -8.23 -8.21 -1.89 -1.87 -1.86
Consumption ϑV,c -0.84 -0.85 -0.89 -1.68 -1.72 -1.85 -0.33 -0.35 -0.37
Hours worked ϑV,n -0.25 -0.31 -0.42 -6.44 -6.38 -6.22 -1.32 -1.29 -1.26
Note: (i) Welfare costs are stated in per-mil of steady state consumption. (ii) sg = τD.
5.2 The role of the monetary policy
Besides the specification of fiscal policy, it is important to scrutinize the welfare performance of al-
ternative optimal simple monetary policy rules. So far, it was assumed that the monetary policy
conducts an interest rate rule with smoothing, stabilizing inflation, output and changes in the ex-
change rate. In continuation, this rule is compared to the following Taylor rules: (i) Inflation only; (ii)
Inflation and output; (iii) Inflation and changes in the nominal exchange rate; (iv) Domestic inflation only;
(v) Domestic inflation and output; (vi) Domestic inflation, output and changes in the nominal exchange rate.
Table 8 reports the results. All rules are evaluated with and without interest rate smoothing. The re-
action parameters for the given policy rules are estimated such that the highest level of unconditional
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welfare in the home economy is attained.
Table 8: Welfare compensation of implementing an exchange rate peg for different monetary policies
Rule(i) No smoothing(iii) Smoothing(iv)
Government size(ii) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
Benchmark -2.25 -3.25 -6.96 -2.25 -3.25 -6.96
(i) γπ > 0 γy = 0 γe = 0 -2.41 -3.67 -8.43 -2.41 -3.67 -8.43
(ii) γπ > 0 γy > 0 γe = 0 -2.25 -3.25 -6.98 -2.25 -3.25 -6.98
(iii) γπ > 0 γy = 0 1 ≥ γe > 0 -2.33 -3.46 -7.72 -2.33 -3.46 -7.72
(iv) γπH > 0 γy = 0 γe = 0 -2.39 -3.60 -8.15 -2.41 -3.67 -8.48
(v) γπH > 0 γy > 0 γe = 0 -2.25 -3.25 -6.97 -2.25 -3.25 -6.97
(vi) γπH > 0 γy = 0 1 ≥ γe > 0 -2.24 -3.23 -6.92 -2.24 -3.23 -6.92
Note: (i) Θ is the % fraction of consumption required to equate welfare under any given policy to the one
obtained under a peg. (ii) sg = τD. (iii) ρR = 0. (iv) 1 ≥ ρR > 0.
A number of implications are worth emphasizing. First, no matter which kind of optimal simple
rule is implemented, pegging the exchange rate leads to welfare losses which are increasing in the
size of government. However, the size of the loss varies according to the specification of the Taylor
rule. Second, strict stabilization of CPI inflation always attains the highest level of welfare. This find-
ing is consistent with a broad literature examining welfare-optimizing monetary policy in an open
economy setting.47 Such a rule implies that there is no trade-off between output gap stabilization
and domestic price stability, and with no need for monetary policy to explicitly consider fluctuations
in the exchange rate. Third, interest rate rules that feature nominal exchange rate stabilization have
better welfare properties than those rules which do not include the exchange rate target. Fourth, in
most cases, allowing for interest rate smoothing increases the welfare costs of adopting a peg. In
other words, under flexible exchange rates the interest rate rules with interest rate smoothing yield
higher welfare results. Finally, whether targeting domestic inflation or CPI inflation does not have a
substantial impact on welfare.
Table 9 summarizes the estimated reaction parameters of the interest rate rules. The interest rate
rule which targets CPI inflation only yields a coefficient γπ at the upper bound of 5, completely
stabilizing inflation. This does not change when interest rate smoothing is included in the rule.
Adding the stabilization of output to the Taylor rule reduces the inflation coefficient to standard
values found and typically used in the business cycle literature. The coefficient on output is around
1, which is a rather high value. When interest rate smoothing is included, the coefficient on inflation is
reduced and the one on output increased. Notably, the output coefficient decreases with government
size, which is related to the automatic stabilizer effect of government size discussed in Section 4.2.
Finally, adding the nominal exchange rate target to the rule instead of output stabilization reveals
that a pure float is not optimal, rather the interest rate should be adjusted to take into account the
fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate.
47See for example Gali and Monacelli (2005), Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007) or Faia and Monacelli (2007).
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Table 9: Estimated parameters of different optimal simple monetary policy rules
Rule(i) No smoothing(iii) Smoothing(iv)
Government size(ii) 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.6
Benchmark γπ 1.15 1.30 1.30 1.14 1.15 1.30
γy 0.25 0.98 1.00 0.23 0.29 1.00
γe 0.02 0.27 0.28 0.02 0.04 0.28
ρR — — — 0.12 0.16 0.04
(i) γπ > 0 γy = 0 γe = 0 γπ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞
ρR — — — 0.00 0.03 0.01
(ii) γπ > 0 γy > 0 γe = 0 γπ 1.25 1.25 1.23 1.17 1.17 1.18
γy 0.98 0.96 0.92 1.55 1.45 1.29
ρR — — — 0.54 0.58 0.64
(iii) γπ > 0 γy = 0 1 ≥ γe > 0 γπ 1.44 1.47 1.76 ∞ ∞ ∞
γe 0.32 0.36 0.60 0.81 0.82 0.82
ρR — — — 0.54 0.58 0.64
Note: (i) The parameter space of γπ is bounded between [1, 5] as in Bergin, Shin, and Tchakarov (2007).
When the upper level of the parameter space is reached, then the value of the coefficient is indicated by
∞. γy is between [0, 5], γe and ρR are between [0, 1]. (ii) sg = τD. (iii) ρR = 0. (iv) 1 ≥ ρR > 0.
5.3 Parameter sensitivity
Finally, it is examined how the predictions of the benchmark model are affected by changes in the
parametrization. For this exercise, a welfare metric similar to the one of Equation 3.7 is computed.
However, instead of using a specific Taylor rule as flexible exchange rate case, here the money supply
rule is used as reference. The expression then reads
Ω =
{(
WPeg0,t −W
MSrule
0,t
)
(1− β)(1− σ) + 1
} 1
1−σ − 1, (5.3)
in which Ω is the fraction of household’s consumption that would be needed to equate conditional
welfare under the money supply rule to the one under a strict peg. Figure 5 displays these welfare
costs. In the first row, parameters concerning the preferences of the household are varied. The param-
eter range is chosen such that values are in line with empirical findings, the business cycle literature
and that equilibrium stability is ensured. Openness, γ, varies between [0, 1], the intertemporal elastic-
ity of substitution in consumption, σ, and in money balances, b, as well as the labor supply elasticity,
ν, vary between [1, 6].48 The second row reports variation in net welfare gains for different degrees of
the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, η, between [1, 6]; the elasticity of
substitution between differentiated goods, ε; the degree of price adjustment costs, κ ∈ [10, 110]; and
the cost of adjusting the capital stock, φK ∈ [0, 20].
First and foremost, the qualitative nature of the results presented in Section 4 is preserved for
all parametrizations studied. The costs of adopting an exchange rate peg increase with government
size. The variation in parameters can, however, reduce the difference in welfare costs that arises
48ν is the inverse of the Frish labor supply elasticity, analytically: εn = Un
n
[
Unn− U
2
cn
Ucc
] = 1ν .
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under different sizes of the public sector. For instance, the difference in welfare costs decreases with
the country’s degree of trade openness or elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. The
contrary is the case for the elasticity of substitution in consumption and the degree of price stickiness.
In continuation, two parameters which are at the core of the main results will be discussed in more
detail.
Figure 5: Welfare costs of adopting a strict peg for different parametrizations
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5.3.1 Labor supply elasticity
The empirical literature focusing on estimating the labor supply elasticity reports values in the range
of 0 – 0.5 for microeconometric estimates, whereas in macroeconomic models the values mostly used
for this elasticity range between 2 – 4.49 Intuitively, all else equal, the lower the labor supply elasticity,
the more willing households are to work if wages increase. For a calibration of ν at a low value, for
instance ν = 1, hours worked are more responsive to changes in the real wage and its volatility is
higher. The stabilizing effect of government spending on hours worked under an exchange rate peg
49See Chetty, Guren, Manoli, and Weber (2011) and Peterman (2012) for overviews.
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gains importance when the labor supply elasticity is low. On the other hand, when the labor supply
elasticity attains a high value, the stabilizing effect of government expenditures on hours worked
under an exchange rate peg looses importance, hence welfare costs of changing the exchange rate
regime are reduced. As displayed in the first row of Figure 5, the welfare costs of moving from a
money supply rule to a pegged exchange rate regime are high when the elasticity is low, and welfare
costs decrease the larger the elasticity. Importantly, the qualitative results from Section 4 with respect
to the role of government size remain.
5.3.2 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
Finally, the extent to which the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods affects
the welfare costs is considered, since empirical studies have reported a variety of values ranging
from 0.2 to 3.5.50 For comparison, the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in different
countries is assumed to take on values between 1 and 6. Intuitively, the foreign shocks dominate the
volatility of output, hours worked and consumption under an exchange rate peg (See also Table 5).
A high elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods translates into higher volatility
of the different consumption aggregates and hence to higher volatility of overall consumption. The
elasticity η amplifies the destabilizing effect of government size on consumption, implying that the
volatility of consumption would be highest for η → ∞, i.e., when the domestic and foreign goods
are perfect substitutes. Two results stand out. On the one hand, we have the fact that the larger η,
the higher the welfare costs of adopting a peg. On the other hand, for a large government size, the
welfare costs increase more strongly than for small governments.
6 Conclusion
The starting point of this paper has been the recent vision of the Bretton Woods Committee together
with the initiative of the International Monetary Stability Board to reform the international monetary
system towards an exchange rate regime which features less market fluctuations in the nominal ex-
change rates. As part of this ongoing debate, Schwartz (2000) linked the viability of an exchange rate
peg, which is a similar regime to the one envisioned by the reform plans, to the size of the govern-
ment sector. According to her point of view, a system of fixed exchange rates is not desirable when
governments are large.
The present paper provides a quantitative investigation of this argument by studying how the net
welfare gains of monetary policies with floating exchange rates over a fixed exchange rate change as
a function of an economy’s public sector size. The main findings are in support of Schwartz’ view, as
net welfare costs of adopting a peg are found to be increasing in government size. This result holds
across many different monetary and fiscal policy specifications as well as for different parametriza-
tions. The intuition is that countries with a larger government sector induce more volatility in the
private sector through a composition effect in aggregate demand and a labor supply effect arising
50See Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld, and Russ (2014) for an overview.
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from distortionary income taxes. Through the lens of the admittedly simple framework, the results
suggest that a return to an exchange rate arrangement in the style of Bretton Woods would come
along with high welfare losses for countries with large public sectors.
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A Model outline
A.1 General equilibrium (Nominal)
Marginal utility of c Uc,t(·) = ΛtPt
Marginal utility of m/p U M
P ,t
(·) = Λt − βEt [Λt+1]
Marginal disutility of n −Un,t(·) = Λt(1− τDt )Wt
Domestic bond holdings Λt = βRtEt [Λt+1]
Foreign bond holdings Λt =
βR∗t
(1 + Ψ′B(StBF,t))
Et
[
Λt+1St+1
St
]
Capital Accumulation kt+1 = (1− δ)kt −ΨK(it, kt) + it
Investment decision ΛtPt = Qt
(
1−Ψ′K,i(it, kt)
)
Tobin’s Q Qt = βEt
[
Λt+1Pt+1(1− τDt+1)Rzt+1+
Qt+1
(
(1− δ) + Ψ′K,k(it, kt)−ΨK(it, kt)
)]
CPI Pt =
[
(1− γ)P1−ηH,t + γP
1−η
F,t
] 1
1−η
Domestic good cH,t = (1− γ)
(
PH,t
Pt
)−η
ct
Imports cF,t = γ
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
ct
Aggregate resources PH,tyt = Pt(ct + it) + PH,tgt + NXt + PtΨB(StBF,t) + PH,tytΨP
Domestic prices
(ε− 1)
ε
= mct −
κ
ε
{(
PH,t
PH,t−1
− π̄H
)
πH,t+
βEt
[(
PH,t+1
PH,t
− π̄H
)
πH,t+1
(
yt+1
yt
)(
Λt+1
Λt
)]}
Domestic production yt = atkαt n
(1−α)
t
Labor demand
Wt
PH,t
= (1− α)mct
yt
nt
Capital demand
Rzt
PH,t
= αmct
yt
kt
Government budget Mt + BH,t + PH,tτt = Rt−1BH,t−1 + Mt−1 + PH,tgt
Foreign Euler equation y∗t
−σ = βR∗t Et
[
y∗−σt+1
π∗t+1
]
Exports c∗H,t = γ
(
PH,t
StP∗t
)−η
y∗t
Net foreign assets StBF,t = R∗t−1StBF,t−1 + NXt
Net exports NXt = PH,tc∗H,t − PF,tcF,t
The equilibrium is closed by specifying the fiscal and monetary policies and the three exogenous
shocks.
40
A.2 General equilibrium (Deflated)
Define the following for deflating the nominal equilibrium by the domestic CPI, Pt:
λt = ΛtPt; pH,t =
PH,t
Pt
; rert =
StP∗t
Pt
; ∆St =
St
St−1
; bF,t = StBF,t
πt =
Pt
Pt−1
; πH,t =
PH,t
PH,t−1
; wt =
Wt
Pt
; mt =
Mt
Pt
; qt =
Λt
Qt
.
The functional forms are given as follows:
Utility function U(·) = c
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ +
ϑ
1− b
(
Mt
Pt
)1−b
− χ n
1+υ
t
1 + υ
Capital adjustment costs ΨK(it, kt) =
ψK
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
kt
Portfolio adjustment costs ΨB(StBF,t)) =
ψB
2
St(BF,t − B̄F)2
Price adjustment costs ΨP(·) =
κ
2
(
PH,t(j)
PH,t−1(j)
− π̄H
)2
yt
The fiscal and monetary policies as well as the exogenous shocks can take on the following forms
Tax policy:
Constant lump-sum tax τLt = τ̄
L
Constant income tax τDt = τ̄
D
Fiscal rule:
Revenue rule
τt
τ̄
=
(
lt−1
l̄
)γ1
Monetary policy:
Flexible Regime (Money supply) Mt = Mt−1
Managed Regime (Taylor rule) R̄t = R̄
(
Pt
Pt−1
)γπ (yt
ȳ
)γy ( St
St−1
) γe
1−γe
Fixed Regime St+1 = St
Shocks log(zt) = ρz log(zt−1) + (1− ρz)z̄ + εz,t for z = y∗, a, p∗
Then we can solve for the deflated general equilibrium given by the set of equations on the next page.
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Marginal utility of c c−σt = λt
Marginal utility of m/p ϑm−bt = λt − βEt
[
λt+1
πt+1
]
Marginal disutility of n nνt = λt(1− τDt )wt
Domestic bond holdings λt = βRtEt
[
λt+1
πt+1
]
Foreign bond holdings λt = β
R∗t
(1 + ψBbF,t)
Et
[
λt+1∆St+1
πt+1
]
Capital Accumulation kt+1 = (1− δ)kt −
ψK
2
(
it
kt
− δ
)2
kt + it
Investment decision qt =
(
1− ψK
(
it
kt
− δ
))−1
Tobin’s Q qt = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
(
(1− τDt+1)Rzt+1+
qt+1
(
(1− δ) + ψK
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)
it+1
kt+1
− ψK
2
(
it+1
kt+1
− δ
)2))]
CPI 1 = (1− γ)p1−ηH,t + γrer
1−η
t
Domestic good cH,t = (1− γ)p−ηH,tct
Imports cF,t = γrer
−η
t ct
Aggregate resources pH,tyt = ct + it + pH,tgt + nxt +
ψB
2
(bF,t)
2 + pH,t
κ
2
(πH,t − π̄H)2 yt
Domestic prices
(ε− 1)
ε
= mct −
κ
ε
{(πH,t − π̄H)πH,t+
βEt
[
(πH,t+1 − π̄H)πH,t+1
(
yt+1
yt
)(
λt+1
λt
)]}
Domestic production yt = atkαt n
(1−α)
t
Labor demand
wt
pH,t
= (1− α)mct
yt
nt
Capital demand
Rzt
pH,t
= αmct
yt
kt
Government budget lt =
Rt
πt
lt−1 −mt(Rt − 1) + Rt pH,t(ḡ− τt)
Exports c∗H,t = γ
(
pH,t
rert
)−η
y∗t
Money supply mt =
mt−1
πt
Net foreign assets bF,t = R∗t−1
∆StbF,t−1
πt
+ nxt
Foreign Euler equation y∗t
−σ = βR∗t Et
[
y∗−σt+1
π∗t+1
]
Net exports nxt = pH,tc∗H,t − rertcF,t
Real exchange rate rert =
∆Stπ∗t
πt
rert−1
Domestic price inflation pH,t =
πH,t
πt
pH,t−1
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B Additional figures
Figure 6: Impulse responses to foreign output shock; money supply rule
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to foreign price shock; money supply rule
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0 20 40
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Seignorage/GDP
0 20 40
−0.15
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
%
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e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 s
.s
.
Quarters
Fiscal Liabilities
0 20 40
−10
−5
0
5
x 10
−4
Quarters
Fiscal Revenues
0 20 40
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
Quarters
Income Taxes
Note: Small sg = τD Benchmark Large sg = τD
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